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Political culture in Ukraine 
Kseniia Gatskova and Maxim Gatskov 
The ‘Euromaidan’ protests in Ukraine (2013–2014) were motivated by people’s great expectations of profound 
change through implementation of reforms and genuine democratization of the society. The realization of these 
expectations depends on many preconditions, among them the pattern of political culture, which reflects the 
readiness of people to contribute actively to the establishment of a new democratic regime in their country. An 
analysis of the political orientations of citizens over the past two decades shows that only a small part of the 
population can be called strong democrats, whereas the majority of the population avoids active political 
participation and holds a rather output-oriented position, which may facilitate the persistence of an authoritarian 
political regime. On the other hand, a new social movement represented by recently emerged numerous volunteer 
organizations and initiatives points to a substantial positive change in people’s political orientations. 
 
 
‘Strong leaders’ or political ideologies?  
In the 25 years of independence, Ukraine experienced 
two large democratically oriented ‘revolutions’ (‘orange 
revolution’ in 2004–2005 and the ‘Euromaidan’ in 2013–
2014). At the end of 2004, mass protests in Independ-
ence Square in Kiev prevented electoral fraud and 
helped to launch democratic reforms. Unfortunately, this 
‘revolution’ failed even after successful constitutional 
reforms, because fundamental institutions and conven-
tional practices remained unchanged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the year 2006, tumultuous conditions within the 
‘orange’ coalition resulted in the highest ever level of 
desire for strong leaders that has been observed be-
fore or since – 65.7%. Figure 1 shows that, during 
1990s, the proportion of people who agreed with the 
statement ‘A couple of strong leaders can do more for 
the country than all laws and discussions’, considera-
bly increased. In the 2000s, it remained almost un-
changed at the level of 60%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: A couple of strong leaders can do more for the country 
than all laws and discussions (%) 
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Nine consecutive years of economic decline after inde-
pendence led to a substantial impoverishment of the 
population and disenchantment in the ‘democratic dis-
order’. Many people associated the shambles of the 
1990s with the absence of a strong leader – as a result, 
paternalistic views experienced a revival. The personal-
istic approach that ‘an effective state manager’ can 
compensate for institutional weakness could have been 
even stronger than in the late Soviet times, when it 
were state institutions which in the face of communist 
leaders’ senility (Brezhnev and his two successors) 
made the political system work.  
In Ukraine, these strong paternalistic, leader-centered 
orientations have been repeatedly exploited during 
parliamentary election campaigns, when political par-
ties were formed around persons instead of programs 
and principles. Given a list of political ideologies (e.g., 
‘liberal’, ‘socialist’, ‘social democratic’ etc.) and an op-
portunity to suggest another one, up to a half of re-
spondents – 49.3% in the Monitoring survey in 2014 – 
had no preferences, had not decided yet or simply had 
no notion of these ideologies. One year after the ‘Eu-
romaidan’, the share of respondents without any pref-
erence in the spectrum of political ideologies de-
creased significantly and made up 38.2%. In this year, 
the survey documented an increase in number of ad-
herents of social democratic as well as national democ-
ratic forces. Still, the proportion of people with no ideo-
logical preferences remains very high, which is an 
indicator of missing knowledge on political system and, 
apparently, lack of interest in politics.  
International surveys confirm a rather low interest in poli-
tics in Ukraine. According to the European Social Survey, 
in 2012, similarly to other post-communist states of Cen-
tral Europe, only 5.3% of Ukrainian respondents said to 
be very interested and 27% to be quite interested in poli-
tics, whereas in Western European countries these 
shares were much higher (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: How interested would you say you are in politics? 
(%) 
  UA  DE  SE  FR  IT  EE  PL  CZ 
 Very interested   5.3 20.2 13.2 12.6 12.6   5.4   6.2   2.2 
 Quite interested 27.0 44.5 45.2 30.4 31.6 35.7 33.4 19.6 
 Hardly interested 43.8 29.9 30.5 36.4 35.8 43.8 42.8 49.7 
 Not at all interested 23.9   5.4 11.1 20.6 19.9 15.2 17.6 28.5 
Source: European Social Survey 2012 
 
Another key element of political orientations of the 
Ukrainian population concerns international orienta-
tions. These orientations do not provide a clear-cut 
distinction between conservative ‘Eastern’ and liberal 
‘Western’ values, as Ukrainians are often guided by an 
intuitive sense of belonging to a respective historically 
defined cultural space, yet they indicate sympathies 
either with consolidated authoritarian regimes of 
Putin’s Russia and Lukashenka’s Belarus or with the 
democratic community of EU-countries. 
Figure 2: How do you regard the idea of Ukraine’s joining… 
the Union of Russia and Belarus? ... the European Union? 
(%) 
 
 
The ‘Euromaidan’ protests and the subsequent an-
nexation of Crimea by Russia along with Russia’s ac-
tive involvement in the armed conflict in Donbas led to 
a re-orientation of many Ukrainians from East to West. 
While in 2010 61.6% of the Ukrainian population re-
garded the perspective of Ukraine’s joining the Union 
of Russia and Belarus positively, in 2015, the picture 
was quite the reverse: 62.1% of respondents rejected 
this option. At the same time, support of Western inte-
gration (joining the European Union) became more 
popular: it increased from 45.6% in 2010 to 56.3% in 
2015 (Figure 2). 
 
Tolerance and pluralism  
Being tolerant to those who are different, respecting the 
rights of minorities and accepting the complexity of the 
social environment are important democratic attitudes 
and values. Empirical research has shown that toler-
ance is associated with economic growth. Open socie-
ties are more attractive for people of different back-
grounds and provide the most favorable environment 
for creativity and innovation. A totalitarian state, which 
suppresses not only political opposition, but – as far as 
possible – all kind of pluralism, fosters intolerance and 
one-dimensional thinking.  
Many Ukrainians experienced both: the monopoly of the 
communist party and a great diversity of political parties 
and movements after 1991. Political pluralism was a 
new, so far unfamiliar phenomenon for the post-Soviet 
states. The growing diversity of the political spectrum 
perplexed inexperienced voters, who tried to adapt to 
the new conditions, while many parties were formed 
around political entrepreneurs pursuing their personal 
economic interests. 
Therefore it might be not very surprising that the share 
of respondents, who did not support a multiparty system 
in Ukraine, grew significantly in the 1990s and remained 
at the level of around 45% after the failed ‘orange revo-
lution’ (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Do you think Ukraine needs a multiparty system? 
(%) 
 
 
While rejection of the multiparty system can be, to a 
large extent, attributed to chaotic politics and a perma-
nent crisis of the political system, to economic hardship 
during of the transformation as well as the ‘after-effect’ 
of Soviet socialization, the high proportion of those who 
could not (or did not want to) give a definite answer 
most likely indicates disinterest in political life and 
alienation from political system. 
After the ‘Euromaidan’ put an end to the authoritarian 
and criminal regime of Viktor Yanukovych, the share of 
supporters of political pluralism began to grow again, 
with 36% in 2015 reaching the level of the year 1994.  
 
Mass protests vs. civil society engagement 
In the fall of 2013, activists started to demonstrate 
against the denial of President to sign the Association 
Agreement with the EU. The demonstrations rapidly 
transformed into a protest of population against the 
government, which lost its legitimation in the eyes of 
protesters by violently breaking up the peaceful dem-
onstration. The ‘revolution of dignity’ stood for Euro-
pean (i.e. Western, democratic) values: rule of law, 
non-oligarchic market economy, welfare state and civil 
society. 
 
Figure 4: Educational level of the general population and 
of participants of the ‘Euromaidan’ 
 
According to the surveys of the Institute of Sociology of 
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, almost one 
fifth of the Ukrainian population took part in the mass 
protests in their city or supported the protesters by pro-
viding food, warm clothes or money. The ‘Euromaidan’ 
protesters were on average younger, more often self-
employed and considerably better educated than the 
general population of Ukraine (Figure 4).  
Five most often mentioned demands of protesters in-
cluded: release of arrested demonstrators and end of 
repressions, resignation of the President Yanukovych 
and appointment of new elections, resignation of the 
government as well as criminal prosecution of corrupted 
politicians and those who were responsible for the vio-
lent actions against protesters (Ukraine-Analysen 
2013). Apparently, the ‘revolution of dignity’ was made 
primarily by those representatives of Ukrainian society, 
who were not ready to tolerate the authoritarian corrupt 
regime. 
The ‘Euromaidan’ protests and the subsequent armed 
conflict in the Donbas region have had a great consoli-
dating and cohesive effect on many Ukrainians. A new 
social movement occurred as a reaction of the population 
on the hard situation in the East of the country: people 
started to found numerous volunteer organizations and 
initiatives that supported the Ukrainian army, provided 
help to internally displaced citizens from the eastern 
regions and performed other social and political activi-
ties. During the last year, 44% of Ukrainian citizens either 
supported volunteer organizations and initiatives or pro-
vided financial help to Ukrainian army through a govern-
mental channel (Public Opinion in Ukraine 2015). The 
data show that people donated money or provided in-
kind support (food, clothes, medicine etc.) more actively 
than personally engaged in volunteer activities (Fig-
ure 5). Approximately 30% of the population donated 
money to volunteers in the last 12 months, while 7% 
transferred money to the specially created account of the 
Ministry of Defense using an sms service.  
 
Figure 5: Volunteer activities and support of Ukrainian 
army 
 
 
Although engagement in volunteer activities may not be 
called ubiquitous (only 3.2% of people performed volun-
teer activities either in the region of military conflict, or 
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this new phenomenon is still very important for Ukraine, 
because it strengthens the civil society. The volunteers 
demonstrate an ability for self-organization and effective 
solving of different kinds of urgent problems. Besides, 
volunteer organizations help to cultivate personal activ-
ism and social responsibility of citizens. 
There are two major types of civic activism that may be 
distinguished in Ukraine: participation in mass protests 
and engagement in civil society organizations. These 
forms of activism overlap only partly. While 17% of citi-
zens participated in the ‘Euromaidan’ either by protesting 
or by providing food, clothes or money, only 13% of the 
population were members of civil society organizations 
(Monitoring survey 2014). Among the participants of the 
‘Euromaidan’ 73.9% were not members of any civil so-
ciety organization. Although almost every fifth citizen 
participated in the ‘Euromaidan’, the political activism of 
protesters seems to be of a short-term nature. The for-
mation of mass protests was a spontaneous reaction (as 
opposed to action), whereas engagement in volunteer 
organizations has more to do with planned and enduring 
social activity. For a sustainable development of the pro-
democratic orientations, it is essential to foster a long-
term engagement of citizens in civil society organiza-
tions. 
  
Political orientations and stability of the political 
system 
What in the public discourse is often referred to as ‘na-
tional character’ or ‘mentality’, can be scientifically cap-
tured by the concept of political culture. This concept 
helps to explain reform failures and – more generally – 
political instability by analyzing the rigidity (sustainability) 
of political orientations of the population. The political 
culture approach (Almond, Verba 1963; Dalton, Welzel 
2014) is still one of the best established theoretical con-
cepts that help to find answers to such questions as: 
Why are some political systems stable and others not? 
Why does the introduction of democratic institutions not 
automatically lead to a consolidated democracy? Which 
role do people’s political orientations play in the process 
of democratization?  
A general definition of the term ‘political culture’ reads 
as follows: “the political system as internalized in the 
cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population” 
(Almond, Verba 1963, p. 14). The political culture ap-
proach focuses on political orientations toward political 
objects, such as the system in general, political input 
and output processes, and the role of the self in the 
system. The basic idea of the approach is to capture 
patterns of attitudes, beliefs and values of the popula-
tion, in order to explore whether political institutions and 
people’s orientations are congruent. The fundamental 
assumption behind this approach is that “a democratic 
form of participatory political system requires as well a 
political culture consistent with it” (Almond, Verba 1963, 
p. 5). If such consistency is not given, political institu-
tions are likely to fail to perform their essential func-
tions. As a result, the political system may become 
unstable. 
Although the concept of political culture does not en-
compass explanatory mechanisms of conflicts between 
people’s orientations and institutional performance, it 
can indicate a mismatch between ‘structure and culture’ 
and thus be used for prognosis of possible instability of 
the political system. For understanding of the post-
communist transformation, the political culture approach 
provides a conceptual framework of analysis of the 
change in people’s political ‘mentality’, i.e. their percep-
tions of the rules of the societal game. 
 
Soviet legacy 
As political culture – especially the system of values 
and key social norms – turns up to be less prone to 
short-term changes than political institutions, the analy-
sis of the transformation of political orientations in the 
independent Ukraine should begin with the late Soviet 
period.  
On the eve of the breakup of the Soviet Union, a group 
of sociologists under the direction of Jurij Levada pub-
lished a famous work, “Ordinary Soviet Man”, based on 
the analysis of survey data collected in all 15 Soviet 
republics between 1989 and 1991. Similarly to Almond 
and Verba, Levada suggested that the “quality of the 
human material” would to a large extent determine polit-
ical as well as other post-communist social structures. 
According to Levada (1993) and his research team, the 
dominant “sociocultural type of personality” in the late 
Soviet period was the so-called Homo Sovieticus. The 
researchers characterized this type of personality as a 
de-individualized mass man, who holds paternalistic 
orientations and is “primitive” with respect to his needs. 
At the same time, Homo Sovieticus has messianic and 
imperialistic aspirations and is convinced of being 
something special in the historical perspective.  
In the 1980s, a large share of ‘ordinary Soviet people’ 
was socialized during the post-war and even post-Stalin 
era and experienced a period of relative economic pros-
perity and ideological stability during Brezhnevian Stag-
nation. From the early childhood, Soviet people learned 
to be a part of the bigger whole by participating in differ-
ent structures that were created and maintained by the 
state (e.g. Little Octobrists, Young Pioneers). The chan-
nels of social mobility were strictly defined and controlled, 
while individual initiatives that did not fit into the all-
encompassing framework of the Soviet state and ideol-
ogy were suppressed. Under a full state management of 
one’s life, adaptation to established rules was less costly 
than attempts to change the situation. Yet instead of true 
loyalty, the repressive political system cultivated political 
passivity and reluctance to participate in public life. Con-
trary to the collectivist doctrine, the real sense of respon-
sibility was restricted to a close circle of family and most 
trusted friends. The largest part of responsibility for the 
organization of ‘ordinary’ people’s life including economic 
activities, housing, education etc. rested with the state.  
Individualism – understood as being different from 
others – was scorned, as it was incompatible with the 
totalitarian ‘same-size-fits-all approach’ and the Marx-
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ist-Leninist ideology with its ultimate truth claim. Such 
a context made pluralism of opinions, interests, ways 
of self-expression impossible and fostered a discrep-
ancy between form and content of people’s actions, 
between artificial formal and genuine informal life, 
between proclaimed and real values. 
One of the far-reaching consequences of this ‘double-
think’ was strengthening of informal social networks that, 
on the one hand, helped to get access to scarce goods 
and services and, on the other hand, secured the possi-
bility to articulate personal on politically sensitive issues 
openly.  
On the eve of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Levada 
meant to observe the dissolution of the ‘personality of 
Homo Sovieticus’, not least in the face of an all-
embracing institutional crisis and imperatives of moder-
nity (Lewada 1993, p. 36 ff). The end of the Soviet ex-
periment marked a new period of history for the new 
independent states. 
 
Types of political culture 
Almond and Verba distinguished between three ideal 
types of political culture: parochial, subject and partici-
pant. The (1) parochial political culture is typical for  
premodern societies, the population of which has dif-
fuse political-economic-religious orientations, hardly 
any knowledge of the political system and ambiguous 
feelings towards it. Typical for the (2) subject political 
culture is a higher awareness of specialized govern-
mental authority and more distinct affective and norma-
tive political orientations. However, subjects are mostly 
output-oriented and do not consider themselves as 
active participants of the political process. In contrast to 
that, the (3) participant political culture is characterized 
by active contribution of the citizens to political life, this 
contribution being guided by comprehensive political 
knowledge.  
In modern societies, participant orientations manifest 
themselves in vital interest in local and national politics. 
Active citizens perform collective action by joining or 
establishing civil society organizations which are known 
to be a powerful source of bridging social capital (Put-
nam 2000). Therefore, the level of development of civil 
society (the so-called third sector) and its relationship 
with the state can serve as an important indicator of the 
participant political culture.  
Another typical characteristic of participant orientations, 
which distinguishes them from the parochial and subject 
ones, is the sense of individual responsibility for the 
situation in the country and community. Participants are 
conscious of their role as citizens for the establishment 
of social order and promotion of democratic norms. 
Ideally, their support of democratic institutions is based 
on reflection upon and acceptance of the basic princi-
ples of democracy: political pluralism, participation and 
representation, division of powers, and rule of law. 
In reality, various mixtures of the three ideal types can 
be observed. The so-called civic culture, which Al- 
 
mond and Verba considered to be the most conducive 
to a democratic political system, is a pattern of all 
three types, with a domination of participant features, 
while “the subject and parochial orientations ‘manage’ 
or keep in place the participant political orientations” 
(Almond, Verba 1963, p. 32). 
A reconstruction of the political orientations of Ukraini-
ans on the basis of survey data from the last two dec-
ades reveals a picture that is far from being comforting 
and promising. ‘Participant’ and other pro-democratic 
orientations constitute a minor part of the political cul-
tural pattern in the population. On the timeline, notable 
change in individual attitudes as well as national pat-
terns of political orientations occurred in the aftermath 
of major political and economic events and not prior to 
them. The majority of the population avoids active polit-
ical participation and remains output-oriented, what may 
facilitate the persistence of an authoritarian political 
regime. 
It is important, though, to keep in mind that the people of 
Ukraine never lived in a consolidated democracy – in fact, 
the political system of the independent Ukraine has al-
ways been more or less authoritarian – and that only a 
negligible share of Ukrainians had experience of living 
abroad in a Western democratic society. As a result, 
many people have a very vague and sometimes extreme-
ly distorted idea of democracy and there is no clear notion 
of democratic principles, institutions, and procedures.  
As R. J. Dalton and Ch. Welzel noticed, participants in 
the true sense may be “absent not only because the 
system would repress them but also because the citi-
zens have not learned the role model of a participant 
citizen.” (Dalton, Welzel 2014, p. 5). Having no tradition 
of participant political culture, people in Ukraine tend to 
reproduce the well-known mechanisms of social inter-
action from the Soviet and early post-Soviet past. While 
in consolidated democracies new generations almost 
automatically learn how ‘democracy works’, in the coun-
tries with no democratic traditions, as Ukraine, such 
mechanisms have to be learned by other means. 
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
One important source of democratic pluralism is certain-
ly the regional diversity of Ukraine. In the last decades, 
this diversity made it impossible for any power group to 
become the only alternative in the country. Although it 
also bears potential for conflict, regional diversity cre-
ates a favorable environment for learning how to deal 
with ethno-linguistic, religious and cultural differences 
and thus to become more tolerant. This process may be 
accelerated through promoting internal mobility of the 
population in the country by improving transport and 
tourist infrastructure as well as internal student and 
pupil exchange programs etc. 
Formal education is another important channel of 
forming of political culture: more political education in 
high schools and universities as well as more student 
and pupil exchange programs with democratic coun-
tries areneeded. Universities should get more aca- 
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demic autonomy and European and American founda-
tions could run rather a 5 to 10 years program of fos-
tering of student self-administration at Ukrainian uni-
versities than short-term initiatives. It is important, 
though, to closely cooperate with the Ministry of Edu-
cation on this matter and to carefully monitor the re-
sults, in order to avoid the possible adverse effect 
which was described above: that there will be form 
without content. 
On the level of civil society, the donor assistance to 
Ukraine, which aims to foster the development of the 
third sector, could be partly readdressed. It might turn 
out that it is more effective to give money to those who 
are ready to volunteer than to professionals who are 
pursuing an alternative career in the third sector. The 
focus of financial and institutional aid should be less 
on overall and professional promotion of democratiza-
tion but more on smaller projects that contribute to 
improvement of life quality. Although these projects 
tackle smaller issues, their beneficial outcomes would 
be perceptible by people, thereby improving the image 
of associational activities in general. In the medium 
and long run, it could turn out to be a more effective 
way of promoting democratization.  
Regarding political competition and representation it is 
crucial to urge and help existing political parties to de-
velop a sharper ‘ideological’ profile instead of being 
paternalistic, leader-centered (P. Poroshenko, V. 
Klychko, O. Lyashko etc.) political enterprises. From the 
established parties the most promising in this respect 
seem to be the crisis-tested Batkivshchyna (“Farther-
land”) party and the young party Samopomich (“Self 
Reliance”). 
On the level of state institutions, democratic partners of 
Ukraine should maintain pressure on the central state 
power to become more transparent and to delegate 
more competences to regional and local bodies. It 
should also not be forgotten that without an independ-
ent judicial system, which is free of corruption, even 
‘participant’ citizens will never develop a habit of re-
specting the rule of law. 
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